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Summary findings
In the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade and  while greater protection raises emigration of the skilled
migration are substitutes (that is, migration decreases  (and has no effect on emigration of the unskilled). That
with trade liberalization). L6pez and Schiff add four  is, any change in trade policy raises total emigration, but
factors to the standard  Heckscher-Ohlin model: labor  trade liberalization improves the average skill level of the
skill levels (skilled or unskilled), international labor  labor force and increased protection lowers it.
mobility, migration costs, and financing constraints.  In case 2 (developing countries with rapidly growing
They examine two types of simulation. Case 1 applies  populations), trade liberalization raises emigration of the
to countries in the post-demographic transition stage,  unskilled and reduces emigration of the skilled. That  is,
with a stable population.  This includes countries of  the average skill level rises and the net effect on total
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  emigration is ambiguous. The opposite occurs with
Case 2 applies to countries with rapidly growing  increased protection.
populations, such as Egypt, El Salvador, Mexico, and  In both cases, the average skill level of the population
Morocco.  falls when protection  increases in the presence of
In case 1 (Eastern Europe and the former Soviet  international migration, high migration costs, and
Union), trade liberalization raises emigration of the  financing constraints. Under the same circumstances, the
unskilled (and has no effect on emigration of the skilled),  skill level rises under trade liberalization.
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World Bank1.  Introduction
The question of whether trade and migration are complements or substitutes has been the
focus of much research and has become a major topic in the policy debate in a number of OECD
countries.  The issue has been discussed prominently in North America  in the context of the
integration of Mexico into NAFTA.  The same has occurred  in Western Europe,  where trade
liberalization with Northern  Africa  and Eastern  Europe has  been seen as a  way of reducing
migration.1
Policymakers in the European Union (EU) have become increasingly concerned with this
issue due to a perceived diminished capacity to absorb immigrants and due to the fear of a large
increase in immigration in the future.  In other words,  demand for immigrant labor has fallen
while the supply is expected to increase.  Similarly, the Mexican crisis of December  1994 and
the subsequent austerity program  has led to fears of a  significant increase  in migration to the
U.S.  In fact, it has been reported that the flow of immigrants from Mexico to the U.S.  was
twice as large in January  1995 than in January  1994.
I The studies which have examined the effects of regional integration have abstracted from
the effect on migration.  A number of interesting papers on regional  integration  in the major
trading areas are presented in Anderson and Blackhurst (1993), including the history, political
economy,  and legal  and institutional aspects  of regional  integration.  On studies of European
integration, see Winters (1992).  On the expansion of the EU and on association  agreements,
see Winters (1993).
1Among other instruments,  policy-makers  have considered using trade policy in order to
deal with the perceived immigration  "threat".  For instance, in the context of the concern with
massive emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU), Germany's foreign minister Kinkel
recently declared that opening West European markets to goods from the east should be a
priority in a new initiative on a common European "ostpolitik" (Financial Times, March 24,
1994).  And in the context of NAFTA, former President Salinas of Mexico stated: "Mexico
wants to export more goods, not people."  Other proponents of  NAFTA, including Vice
President Gore, have also argued that NAFTA will help reduce the migration pressure from
Mexico.  This assumes that liberalizing  trade results in lower migration.
The traditional  trade literature based on the Heckscher-Ohlin  model claims that trade
liberalization  leads to a fall in international  migration by reducing international factor price
differences. And since  trade liberalization  results in more trade, the implication  is that trade and
migration  are substitutes. 2 However, the assumptions  made in this literature do not necessarily
reflect the actual conditions  under which  migration  between developing  and developed  countries
takes place.
Other trade theoretic papers (Markusen 1983, Wong 1983) have argued that trade and
migration  may in fact be complements.  Markusen  argues that substitution  is a special  case based
on factor proportion models.  He claims that if the basis for trade is other than a difference in
relative factor endowments  - such as a difference  in technology  or economies  of scale - then
trade and migration are complements.  Economies of  scale, combined with preference for
diversity, result in intra-industry  trade and can explain an important  share of North-North  trade.
It  is less relevant for North-South trade.  Technological  differences are more imnportant  in
2The seminal paper which derives the substitutability  result is Mundell (1957).
2explaining North-South trade.  However, Markusen's  complementarity result in that case is due
to the assumption that technology is higher in one country but only in one sector.  Alternatively,
one might realistically assume that the higher technology is embedded in one factor (say, capital)
which  is more productive  in  both  sectors  in the  more  advanced  economy  (say,  with  better
machinery in both the agricultural and industrial sectors).  If the cross-country difference in the
technology of capital is the same in both sectors,  we obtain the standard result that migration
and trade are substitutes.
The migration literature claims that trade and migration are complements in the short and
medium  run though not  in the long  run,  so that liberalizing  trade  will raise  migration for  a
period which may last ten or even twenty years (U.S.  Commission for the Study of International
Migration 1990, Russell and Teitelbaum 1992, Martin 1993).  Though the ideas presented in that
literature may have a lot of merit,  no rigorous framework  is presented.
Previous studies based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model conclude that trade and migration
are substitutes.  Our analysis expands on the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model by adding some
features  which  are  characteristic  of  developing  countries,  and  which  result  in  substitution
between trade and migration in some cases and complementarity  in others.
The purpose  of this  paper is to shed  some light on the conditions  under  which trade
liberalization  in the developing countries  is likely  to cause an  increase  or a  decrease  in out-
migration.  The paper also examines the impact of trade liberalization on the skill composition
of migration and of the labor force.  For this purpose, we explicitly incorporate four additional
features in the Heckscher-Ohlin  model: heterogeneiLy of labor  skills,  international migration,
migration costs and constraints on financing migration.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  In Section 2,  supporting evidence
on  migration  costs  and  financing  constraints  is presented.  Section  3 discusses  some  basic
assumptions.  Section 4 sets forth the basic model and Section 5 derives the comparative  static
results.  Section 6 provides some extensions and Section 7 concludes.
2.  Evidence on Migration Costs and Financing  Constraints
Starting with financing constraints, many potential migrants in developing countries have
little or no collateral and cannot obtain the necessary credit to finance their migration costs.  As
they are unable to borrow money based on their higher expected future earnings  - especially
since these earnings  are expected  to  materialize  in  another  country  - workers  who  want to
emigrate must for the most part rely on their own savings to finance their migration costs.3
Second, migration costs may account for a large share of the income of potential migrants
from  developing countries.  The empirical  evidence regarding  these costs  is limited but  two
recent  studies by  Richard  Adams  (1991,  1994) report  high  migration  costs  to  the Gulf  for
potential emigrants  from Pakistan and Egypt.  The average cost of migration for an emigrant
from rural Pakistan to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, for example, was Rs 21,000 or U.S.  $1,300 at
the time a  survey of 727 households  was performed  (1986-89).  Data  indicate that this cost
constituted an effective constraint to migration for potential migrants in the poorer  households.
Similar findings are obtained in the case of Egypt.  A survey of 1,000 households in rural
Egypt performed in 1986 revealed that the average cost of migrating to Irak was US $365.  If
one  includes  the subsistence cost  required  for  the  two-month period  that  was  necessary on
3 They might have access to credit in the informal market at prohibitive rates, but the net
present value of the migration project would be negative in those cases.
4average to find a job  in Iraq, the full migration cost is closer to U.S.  5500.  Because of the cost
of obtaining a number of expensive permits, the migration cost to Saudi Arabia was about U.S.
$1,000 or twice the cost of migrating to Irak.  These figures are extremely high considering that
the average monthly wage for the people surveyed was only U.S.  $65.  Thus, the migration cost
to  Saudi Arabia  (Irak)  was equivalent to  a  fifteen  (eight)  month salary  for  these (potential)
emigrants,  a sum which is not easy to accumulate out of own savings.
What is the combined effect of migration costs and credit  constraints?  Some evidence
is available from Reed (1994) who examines migration behavior from  the Northeast of Brazil,
the country's  poorest region, to Sao Paulo in the South.  She finds that adverse economic shocks
in the Northeast deter migration while family wealth promotes it.  Reed concludes that migration
from the Northeast of Brazil is limited by credit constraints.  She also  finds that the negative
impact of credit constraints is weaker in the case of individuals with more years of schooling.
This paper attempts to explain some of these findings by formulating a migration model which
incorporates migration costs, credit constraints and skill heterogeneity.
3. Some Basic Assumptions
In the presence of migration costs and financing constraints,  a richer analysis is obtained
by allowing for both skilled and unskilled labor.  We assume  that both types of workers  are
identical except that the skilled workers are more productive.  Both types of workers  live two
periods.  They work in their home country in the first period, earn some income, and must then
decide whether or not to use some of that income to migrate.
Migration is assumed to take place from a small labor-abundant economy in the South
to  a capital-abundant  economy in  the North  with  the same technology.  The  South initially
5protects  its capital-intensive activities (Krueger  1978; Bhagwati 1978) and the North imposes
restrictions on imports from the South.  The latter results  in lower export prices for the South.
Both protection in the South and in the North result in a lower wage rate in the South than in
the North.  4
Trade liberalization under  these assumptions can be characterized by a reduction in the
tariff rate imposed by the South, by an increase in the export prices faced by the South due to
a  relaxation  of  the  North's  restrictions  on  imports  from  the  South  (as  in  a  preferential
agreement), or both.  Given the usual symmetry and homogeneity conditions, it is clear that the
effects on factor prices in the South of a reduction in (tariff) protection or of an increase in the
export price are qualitatively the same.  Both will cause a rise in the wage rate and a reduction
in the rental price of capital if the South protects its capital-intensive activities and export labor-
intensive goods.  In this paper we choose to focus the analysis on a reduction of protection in
the South.  In  fact,  a  number  of  developing  countries  which  are  a  significant  source  of
migration flows to the North - such as Mexico and Morocco - have liberalized their trade regime
unilaterally.  Consequently, the analysis focuses on the effects of unilateral  trade liberalization
in the South.
41n reality, wage differences between North and South are caused by other factors as well.
These include differences  in the level of technology  and  in the level  of human capital.  We
generate a lower wage  in the South (and thus an  incentive to  migrate) through  protection of
imports because  we are interested  in the impact of changes in trade  policy on the level  and
composition of migration flows.  Adding a difference  in technology or human capital between
North and South has no qualitative effect on our results (but see the extensions in Section 6).
64.  The Model
We start from a Heckscher-Ohlin  model and add four features which reflect conditions
found in many developing  countries: skill heterogeneity,  international  labor mobility, migration
costs and financing  constraints. 5 Consider a small open economy  in the South which produces
two goods under a constant returns technology  using capital and labor.  Capital and labor are
assumed to be mobile across the two sectors.  There are two categories of labor, skilled and
unskilled,  which differ in their productivity  by a factor -y (y  >  1).  That is, skilled workers are
-y times more efficient than unskilled workers, but otherwise both labor inputs are identical.
Thus, the production functions  of each sector can be represented  as follows:
(1)  yi  =  Fi (L-u +  yL s, Ki);  i  =  1, 2,
where yi is output of industry  i, Liu and Lis are the levels of unskilled  and skilled workers  used
in industry  i, respectively, and Ki is the level of capital in industry i.
Since the relative labor efficiency  is the same in both sectors (i.e., -y  is identical  for the
two industries),  and since labor is fully mobile across sectors, it follows that the real wage rate
for skilled workers is y times the real wage for unskilled  workers, or
(2)  Ws =  Yw,
where ws is the real wage of skilled workers and w is the real wage of unskilled  workers.
5For an exposition of the Heckscher-Ohlin  model, see Dixit and Norman (1980) and
Woodland (1982).
7Given  equation  (2), the minimum  average  cost functions  for each industry  can be written
as functions  of either ws or w.  We choose to express them in terms of w.  Normalizing  the
world prices to unity, competitive  long-run equilibrium  with diversified production implies
(3)  (i)  c (*,  r)  + T,
(ii)  c2(*,  r)  =  1,
where ci() (i =  1, 2) are the minimum  average  costs in each industry, r is the (nominal)  rental
price of capital, *  is the nominal wage for unskilled workers, and  T  is the rate of tariff
protection  to the capital-intensive  industry 1.  Equations  (3) solve for w and r, and substituting
the value of *  obtained from equation (3) into equation (2), we obtain the nominal wage rate
for the skilled worker, wS.
We  assume that migration is  costly and that the  cost of  migration differs across
individuals  according  to their location  and their migration-specific  skills. International  migration
costs are lower for people living close to the border with the destination  country rather than in
remote locations, for those who are better at searching for jobs in the destination  country, for
those who are better informed  about the market for illegal  migration services, and generally  for
those living in cities rather than in rural areas. 6
Real migration costs for skilled workers are also likely to  be lower than those for
unskilled  workers.  There are at least two reasons for that.  First, one would expect the skills
of the skilled  workers to also apply to the ability to acquire information  about  job opportunities
61t should be noted that the relevant migration costs from the viewpoint of financing
constraints include not only transportation costs and fees  for intermediaries but also the
subsistence cost while searching for a job in the destination country.
8in the destination country, about best migration routes, and  ,:  legal aspects related to
residence  and work in the destination  country.  Second.  a larger proportion  of unskilled  workers
migrates illegally. This is the case, for instance, with Mexican immigration  to the U.S.  And
illegal  immigration  is generally  more expensive  than legal immigration  because of the payments
illegal  migrants need to make to the intermediaries  who provide illegal migration  services (the
so-called "coyotes" on the Mexico-U.S. border), and because a share of illegal migrants gets
caught and must make more than one attempt before succeeding.  Thus, we assume different
migration  cost functions  for the skilled and unskilled  workers:
(4)  (i)  g =  g(Lu  - Mu);  g'  < °,  g(°)  = g,
(ii)  h =  h(Ls - Ms);  h'  <  0,  h(O) = h,
and g(x) 2  h(x) for any x 2  0,
where g( )(h())  is the migration cost of unskilled (skilled) workers, LIl (Ls) is the initial
endowment  of unskilled  (skilled)  workers, and Mu (Ms) is the total amount of unskilled  (skilled)
workers who migrate.  The fact that g'( ) and h'(-) are both negative implies that  migration
costs increase  with the level of migration, and that, ceteris paribus, workers for whom  migration
costs are the lowest migrate first.  In equation (4), g and h are the costs for the workers with
the highest migration  costs and who are the last to migrate.
We assume that workers  do not have access to credit to finance their migration  costs and
that their wage is their only source of income. 7 Workers are assumed to live two periods.
7As is the case in many developing countries, capital is assumed to be concentrated  in the
hands of a few capitalists.  Their entire income comes from capital so that they have no
incentive to migrate.  And since migration is costly, they remain in the South.
9They get paid and consume at the end of each period.  Their decision is whether or not to
migrate  at the end of the first period.  Output is assumed to be perishable, so that consumption
- plus migration  costs if they  decide to migrate  - equals income in each period. Also, workers
need a minimum  level of income in order to subsist.  Thus, a worker is able to migrate at the
end of the first period if his/her wage in that period is greater than or equal to the sum of the
subsistence wage and the migration costs.  Of course, this is only a necessary condition for
migrating  and not a sufficient  one.
Unskilled  worker j maximizes  the present value VJ of his/her utility flow
(5)  Vi  =  U(Cli)  +  bU(C2),
where 6 is an intertemporal  discount factor and CJ is the aggregate cinsumption level in period 1
i.  The budget constraint if  he/she does  not  migrate and  does  not,  therefore, save  is
E(p1, UlJ)  =  *1  and E(p2 Ui)  =  w2, where E(-) is the expenditure function, Pk (k =  1, 2)
is a vector of goods prices in each period, and *1 and *2  are the nominal unskilled wages in
period one and two, respectively.
If preferences are homothetic, then we can write El  =  Ui  e(p1) and E2  =  Ui  e(P2),
where  e(-)  is  a  cost-of-living index  and  UJ  is  utility  in  period  i.  In  this  case,
2~~~~~~~
uj=  w  w',Uj  =  w  _  w2,  where  w1 and  w2 are  the  real  wages.  If
I  pe(p)  2  e(p2)
preferences are Cobb-Douglas,  then the cost-of-living  index is also Cobb-Douglas  and, hence,
given that world prices are normalized  to one, e(-) =  (1 +  T)a,  where  t is the share of good
1 in consumption. Hence the real wage is simply equal to the nominal wage divided by (1 +
10Workers expect policies to remain unchanged over time and any policy change is assumed
to be permanent.  Unskilled workers earn w'  =  w in the home country (South) in period  1.
If unskilled worker j  remains in the South in period 2,  he/she will earn w2 =  w in period 2 as
well.  Then the utility level of worker j  if he/she does not migrate is VAJ =  w  +  bw.  If the
unskilled worker j migrates,  he/she must first invest a migration cost gJ (for the unskilled) at the
end of period 1 in order  to earn the higher wage w* at the end  of period 2.  Then utility is
VBJ =  (w - gJ) + 6w.  Potential migrants compare  VAJ and VBJ and select the larger of the
two.  This is of course subject to the financing constraint that w be greater or equal to the sum
of the subsistence cost and the cost of migration.  If w is smaller, then VAJ is the only choice.
The condition VAj  >  VBJ is equivalent to  the condition  w  - w  >  gJ.  For
simplicity, we abstract from the discount factor 6.  Then, the condition VAJ >  VBJ is equivalent
to the condition that w  - w  >  gi,  or to the condition that the wage difference be larger than
the migration cost.  These simplifying assumptions have no qualitative effect on our results.  8
Thus, the unskilled worker j  is assumed to migrate if
(6)  (i)  w - w  2  gi, and
(ii)  w  - w  > gi,
8 Of course, if 6. differed across workers, then this would be another  reason why workers
J
Ii
would have different  effective  migration  costs, where effective  migration  costs are defined as  g.
J~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In fact, as  long as the  discount rate  6j is constant  for  eaich worker  and  does  not vary  with
his/her wage, we can redefine the cost of migration as (i  =  gJ/8i and proceed  with GJ rather
than with gJ.  This would not affect the ensuing  analysis.
11where w is the subsistence  wage, w  is the unskilled wage rate abroad and gi is the migration
cost relevant to unskilled worker j.9  The same condition (6) holds for the skilled workers,
where the unskilled  wages  are replaced  by the skilled  wages  and the migration  cost g is replaced
by h.
We first assume that the binding constraint to the migration of skilled workers is the
incentive  to migrate while the binding constraint to the migration of unskilled workers is the
financing  constraint.  These assumptions  seem to be supported by some of the available (and
limited) evidence and were selected because they enable us  to  show in  a  clear way the
differential impact that changes in trade policy have on the migration of skilled and unskilled
labor. In Section  4, we also examine  the effects of trade liberalization  in the more general case
where these assumptions  are relaxed.
Thus, the wage for skilled workers is assumed  to be sufficiently  above w to cover the
maximum  migration  cost possible among the skilled workers, i.e.,  Ws  - w >  h.  That is, the
migration  cost is assumed not to be a binding constraint even for the skilled worker with the
highest  cost of migration. Thus, the total migration of skilled workers will be determined  by
(7)  -y(w*  - w)  =  h(Ls - Ms).
9 Condition (6)(ii) holds under the assumption that w and w  will remain unchanged in
the future. If potential migrants  believe that w or w  may change over time, then there are two
reasons why condition (6)(ii) may not hold.  First, if potential migrants are risk averse, they
will also be concerned with the distribution of w and w* and, ceteris paribus, will prefer the
one with the lower variance. Second, even under risk neutrality, condition (6)(ii) may not hold
because migration involves an element of irreversibility or hysteresis.  Once the person has
migrated, if the return on migration falls (say, because w increased unexpectedly),  the person
cannot undo the migration choice in a costless way because of the exit cost (migration costs
must be paid to return to the home country). These considerations lead migrants to demand
a higher rate of return on migration in order to cover (insure) against these potential losses.
On hysteresis, see Dixit (1989) and Pindyck (1988).
12We assume that -y(w - w) <  h, because otherwise all skilled workers would migrate.
For the unskilled workers we assume that constraint (6)-(ii) is not binding. That is, the
gap between foreign  wages  and domestic  wages is greater than the migration cost of the workers
with the highest migration  cost, or w  - w >  g.  By contrast, constraint (6)-(i) is binding for
at least some workers.  Thus, migration  of the unskilled workers is determined  by
(8)  w - w = g(Lu - Mu).
Given  w and w, only a subset  of the unskilled  workers is able to pay the migration  costs.
This subset migrates.  Figure  1 shows the situation where w* - w  >  g and w - w  <  g.  All the
unskilled workers would like to migrate since their income gain w* - w is larger than the
migration cost g of the least efficient  potential migrant.  However, not all are able to pay for
the cost of migration. Out of the initial total population  of unskilled workers, OLu, only OMu
workers are able to finance their migration  costs from their income net of the subsistence  wage.
This means that at the start of the second period, OMu unskilled workers have emigrated and
the total effective  endowment  of unskilled labor is L, - Mu.
Figure 2  shows the migration equilibrium for  skilled workers,  with  OMS workers
emigrating at the end of period 1 and the endowment  of skilled workers at the start of period
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Figure 2.2 equal  to  Ls - MS'  Note  that  Figure  2 differs  from  Figure  1.  In  Figure  1,  the binding
constraint on migration is the ability to finance the migration costs.  In Figure 2,  the binding
constraint is the wage differential between the destination and the home country.
There  is a  strong element  of irreversibility  in  the migration  of labor.  For  instance,
assume that in the second period the wage in the destination country  is lower than expected at
migration tirne and/or that the wage in the sending country is higher than expected.  Hence, in
retrospect,  some emigrants would have been better off had they not migrated.  However,  they
will not return unless  w  falls sufficiently below w to  make it worthwhile  to pay  for return
migration costs.  Since wages in the North (or West) are typically higher than in the South (or
East), there will be no return migration even if some migrants would have preferred not to have
migrated  given the new  wage configuration.  In  our  model,  with  protection  of  the capital-
intensive sector in the South and positive return migration costs, migrants do not return.
To close the model we need to include the conditions for  factor market equilibrium,
(9)  (i)  c1()y1 +  c  2  OY2 =-u  - Mu +  -Y(Ls  - Ms)
(ii)  c4(iyl  +  C2()y2 =  K,
where Yi (i  =  1, 2) are the output levels in each  industry  and  K is the total  endowment of
capital.  The labor endowment is expressed in labor efficiency units of those workers remaining
in the country (with Mu  =  Ms  = 0 during the first period).
Equations  (2), (3-i), (3-ii), (7), (8), (9-i) and (9-ii) solve for *,  *s,  r, Mu, Ms, y1 and
Y2. In  fact,  the system is  recursive,  with  (3-i)  and  (3-ii)  solving  for  *  and  r;  *S  is next
obtained from (2), Mu and Ms are solved from (7) and (8) and finally (9-i) and (9-ii) solve for
16y,  and Y2.  Note that the real wages w and ws are obtained by using w =  */(1  +  T)a and ws
=  Ws/(1  +  T)a'.
5.  The Effect of Trade Liberalization
In this section, we examine the comparative  statics of trade liberalization  by the country
of the South. We first examine  the effect of a change in the tariff level T within a given country
over time with stable population,  and then compare two countries with stable population  which
are identical  except for their tariff level T.  In the comparison  over time, we assume that the
tariff level was perrnanently  fixed in the past, so that the country is in long-run equilibrium,  and
we examine the effect of a trade reform (i.e., of a change in the tariff level).  In the cross-
country comparison,  we examine  the differences  between  two countries  which are at their long-
run equilibrium  under different tariff levels.  The latter is equivalent to a comparison  within a
given country  over time with population  growth  replacing the emigrants (under the initial trade
regime).  IO  The two types of simulations  are identical if there are no irreversibilities. In the
case of migration, irreversibilities  are present and the two simulations  give different results.
The comparison  over time with stable population  may apply to countries  which are in the
post-demographic  transition stage, such as Eastern European countries and countries from the
former Soviet Union  where the rate of population  growth is about nil.  As mentioned  above, the
cross-country comparison is qualitatively equivalent to a comparison within a country with
population growth and applies to immigration from countries such as  Egypt, Morocco and
Mexico who experience rapid population  growth.
10 Changes in the trade regime wiZl  affect the level and skill composition of migration.
Population growth is assumed to be equal to the initial level (and composition)  of migration
and not to change with changes in trade policy.
17A.  Comparison  over time
A. 1.  Skilled (unskilled)  labor constrained  by incentives  (costs).
We first consider the case where unskilled workers' migration is cost-constrained  and
skilled workers' migration is incentive-constrained. This assumption is supported by Reed's
empirical results mentioned  earlier.  In section A.2, we show the conditions under which this
is true.  Consider  the case of a country in the South in long-run  equilibrium  with unskilled  labor
force Lu - Mu and skilled labor force Ls - Ms.  Assume the country carries out a partial trade
liberalization  which is represented  by a fall in tariff protection  T to the capital-intensive  import-
substitution  sector.  This causes * and *s to increase  and causes r to fall.  Since the nominal
wages *  and *s  increase and r falls, the real wages w and ws increase proportionately  more
than the nominal wages.  With partial trade liberalization, wages in the domestic economy
remain lower than wages abroad.  The fact that unskilled wages increase enables a greater
number of unskilled workers to finance their migration costs.  Thus, migration of unskilled
workers takes place and a new equilibrium  occurs at a migration  level above Mu in Figure 1.
The equilibrium  level of skilled migrants, however, is not affected by the reduction in
the gap between wages at home and abroad if Ms workers have already migrated (Figure 2).
Although  fewer workers would have wanted  to migrate at the higher real wage ws, those who
already migrated will not return since  -yw  >  -yw  and return migration is costly.  Hence, trade
liberalization  causes no skilled migration  flow and no change in the stock of skilled workers
remaining  in the South.
Thus, the effect of partial trade liberalization  is three-fold: it raises the total stock of
migrants; it lowers the total labor endowment  of the economy; and it raises its average skill
18level.  Trade and labor migration  are complements  rather than substitutes  in this case.  The net
effect on the domestic production of exportables and import substitutes is ambiguous. Trade
liberalization  has a positive impact on the production of exportables and a negative impact on
the  production of  importables.  On  the  other  hand,  the  increased migration that trade
liberalization  induces  the opposite (Rybczynsky)  effect.
We show at the end of Section A.2 the conditions under which the assumption  of an
incentive  constraint  for skilled  workers and a cost constraint  for unskilled  workers holds. These
conditions  are more likely to hold the higher is the subsistence  wage and the higher is -y, the
parameter of wage difference  between skilled and unskilled labor.
A.2.  Unskilled labor constrained  by either costs or incentives.
Consider now the case where domestic wages for unskilled workers in the South are
closer to those in the North so that the assumption that w* - w >  g does not necessarily
hold.11  In this case, migration of unskilled workers may be determined by the capacity to
finance migration  costs when the wage is low and by the expected wage gain if the domestic
wage is higher (as might occur with trade liberalization). Figure 3 shows the migration  supply
function in this case.  12 Point B is the only point where both conditions are binding, that is
where w* - w = g = w - w.  This occurs when w = (w  + w)/2.  This is also the maximum
11 As mentioned  earlier, differences in technology or human capital could have been used
to generate the wage difference. Then, this case might apply to a middle income country  while
the case examined in sub-section A.1 would apply to a lower income country, with the wage
difference between the two types of countries due to technology or human capital differences.
In this model, wage differences  are generated  by trade policy. Then, the analysis  in sub-section
A.2 applies to the case of lower trade protection.
12 Note that now in Figure 3 we are using w rather than w - w on the vertical axis.
19migration point (Mu).  Thus for w  >  (w  +  w)/2 the relevant migration schedule is CB while
for w  <  (w* +  w')/2 the relevant migration schedule is AB.
Note that as the wage rate increases, migration does not rise indefinitely.  It reaches its
maximum at Mu for the unskilled and Ms for the skilled (see Figure 4).  Thus, the model yields
a maximum rather than an unbounded migration level.  This is an appealing feature since it is
consistent with the observation that countries do not empty themselves of their entire population.
The maximum outmigration of  effective  labor is M  =  Mu  +  -YMs.  As  is well known,  a
country may specialize in production if migration is sufficiently large.  the analysis is based on
the assumption that specialization in production takes place at a level of migration larger than
M.
In Figure  3,  a  trade  liberalization that  raises the domestic  wage  rate  from  wo to  w,
would increase the stock of migrant workers from MO to Ml  and trade and migration would thus
be  complements.  If the wage  increase  is larger  (because  trade  liberalization  is deeper)  and
wages increase from w0 to w2, migration patterns switch from the AB to the CB schedule.  The
interesting point is that in this case because initially MO workers are already out of the country
and w* is higher than w2, workers will not come back and thus trade liberalization would have
no effect.  That is, trade liberalization can never lead to return migration and to a decrease in
the stock of migrants.  It will either  raise the number of migrants or will leave it unchanged.
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- ---  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --Under  what conditions  is it true that migration  of unskilled  workers is determined  by the
financing  constraint  while migration  of skilled  workers  is determined  by the incentive  constraint?
From the previous analysis, it is clear that this occurs when
(10)  (i)  w <  w  2  w,  and
ws  +w
(ii)  ws  >  2
*  *
where w 5 =  yw*. Equations (10-i)  and (10-ii) are simultaneously  satisfied if
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Figure 4.If w is outside the range set by equation (11),  both  skilled and  unskilled workers are
w  +  w
either cost-of-migration-constrained (if  w <  s  ) or both are incentive-constrained (if
*  _~?  y*7  - w  +  w
w>  w  2  )  Anything  that  increases  (w  - s  )  =
I  [w  *  -__  +/_  w_  raises  the  range  for  which  inequality  (11)  holds.  Thus,  the
larger  is the subsistence wage and  the larger  is the  wage differential  -y between  skilled and
unskilled labor, the broader is the wage range for which inequality (11) holds,  i.e.,  for which
migration of skilled workers is incentive-constrained and migration of unskilled workers is cost-
constrained.  13
To summarize the above, we can state
Proposition  1. The effect of trade liberalization in a country with stable population is as
follows: 1) it raises the migration of unskilled workers; 2) migration of skilled workers remains
unchanged; 3) the size of the labor force falls; 4) the average skill level rises; but 5) in the case
where unskilled labor becomes incentives-constrained after trade  liberalization,  their migration
level may remain unchanged.
The effect of increased protection is as follows:  1) it has no effect on the migration of
unskilled workers; 2) it raises  the migration of skilled workers;  3) it lowers the average skill
level of the population; and 4) it reduces the size of the labor force.
13 We have assumed that the wage differential  y in the South is not necessarily  equal to
the  wage  differential  in the North  y  . If y = y7, then  w  = w5 /Y and  the range  set by equation
(  1  I  )  s  i  m  p  I  i  f  i  e  s  t  o
W(24)
24B.  Comparison across countries.
We now turn to a comparative statics exercise which compares two countries in the South
which are identical except for their trade regime.  This comparison applies also to the effect of
a trade reform  in a given country whose population growth replaces the pre-reform  migrants.
The question in this case is: how do the level and composition of the labor force differ in two
countries which have identical technologies, equal initial factor endowments, and which face the
same world prices but differ in the level of protection conferred to the capital-intensive industry.
Using Figures  3 and 4 can provide some insights in this respect.  The high protection
country has lower wages than the low protection country.  If the unskilled wage rate is below
(w  +  w)/2, more unskilled labor will have migrated in the country that has a more liberal trade
regime (complementarity between trade liberalization and migration).  And if the skilled wage
rate  is  above (w* +  w)/2,  the  more  liberal  country  will  have  fewer  skilled  workers  who
migrated  than  the  more  protected  country  (substitution  between  trade  liberalization  and
migration).  That  is,  if migration of unskilled workers  is cost-constrained and that of skilled
workers is incentive-constrained,  we obtain that the more open country will have had a  larger
emigration of unskilled workers and a smaller emigration of skilled workers.  Thus, the effect
on the total level of migration is ambiguous.  Consequently,  the labor force may be larger or
smaller in the country which follows a more liberal trade policy, but it will unambiguously be
more skilled.
Alternatively,  assume that population growth within a country is such as to replace the
migrants and leave the level and skill composition o0 the population unchanged given the initial
trade policy.  Then, trade liberalization will result in a continuous increase in the skill level of
25the population. The reason is that fewer  skilled  and more unskilled workers  leave than are being
replaced. The effect on the labor force as a whole is ambiguous.
To summarize  the above, we can state
Proposition  2. Comparing  two countries with stable populations  but with different trade
policies, and assuming that unskilled workers are cost-constrained in both, the more open
country  will have: 1) a larger emigration  of unskilled  workers; 2) a smaller emigration  of skilled
workers; and 3) a more skilled  population.
6.  Extensions
The approach developed here can be used to  study the effect of  other policies and
exogenous  changes on migration. Three cases are briefly examined  here.
First,  setting a  minimum wage for unskilled labor results in unemployment in the
standard  Heckscher-Ohlin  model  (and specialization).  Assuming  that unskilled  labor experiences
a constraint on financing  migration  costs, the higher minimum wage will result in an increase
in migration and in a lower level of unemployment.  Moreover, employers will substitute
towards skilled labor whose wage will increase.  This will have no impact on migration of
skilled labor if the comparison is within a country with stable population, and will result in
lower emigration  of skilled  labor  under the other comparisons. Thus, a minimum  wage law will
create less unemployment  in the presence of migration  and financing constraints  and will raise
the average skill level.
Second, if wages in the South are lower because of a lower level of human  capital than
in the North, an increase in human  capital would not necessarily  affect the incentive  to migrate
(since wages would rise in both countries for those who acquire more human capital), but it
26would  weaken  the financing  constraint. This would result in a higher level of emigration of the
less skilled labor who were originally affected by the financing constraint.  In that case, an
investment  which raised the level of human capital  uniformly across the labor force would  raise
the average  skill level in two ways: first, because of the investment, and second, because more
unskilled  labor would migrate. 14
Third, assume a growing economy  whose level of wages increase over time and
whose population  grows as well. Assume  that in the early stage  of its development,  the country
consists mainly of unskilled workers whose migration is restricted by  financing constraints.
Then, the increase in the level of wages will result in an increase in migration.  This increase
will continue  until the financing  constraint is no longer binding, i.e., when w >  (w* + w)/2.
As wages rise above that level for most workers, the effect of a further increase in wages is a
reduction  in the level of migration. This reduction  continues  until the wage differential  is equal
to the migration cost of  the most efficient migrant, at which point migration stops.  This
migration  pattern over time was found by Faini and Venturini (1993) for Greece, Portugal and
Turkey.
7.  Conclusion
This paper has considered the impact of trade  liberalization in  a  small developing
economy on the migration of skilled and unskilled workers to higher-wage countries.  The
analysis  is developed  using a modified  Heckscher-Ohlin  framework  that allows for heterogeneity
14The above is rigorously true if the utility function is log-linear, so that the incentive to
migrate depends on the relative wage differential. If the utility function is closer to a linear
function,  then an increase in human capital would raise the incentive to migrate. However,  as
long as marginal utility of income is diminishing, the effect of an increase in human capital
on the financing constraint will be larger than the effect on the incentive to migrate.
27of skills,  international labor mobility, migration costs, and constraints  on financing migration
costs.  Consistent with the stylized facts, developing countries are assumed to protect capital-
intensive activities.
We showed that migration of unskilled, financially constrained  workers increases while
migration of skilled workers is unaffected by trade liberalization  in a developing country with
stable population.  That is, trade and migration of unskilled workers are complements, with trade
liberalization resulting  in  a smaller  and more  skilled  labor force.  Comparing  two  identical
countries except for their trade regimes, we found that the country with lower tariffs has a larger
emigration of unskilled workers (trade and migration of unskilled workers are complements) and
a smaller emigration of skilled workers (trade and migration of skilled workers are substitutes),
resulting in a more skilled labor force and in an ambiguous effect on the size of the labor force.
The same result holds in the case of a trade reform within a  country with population growth
replacing the migrants in  the pre-reform  situation.  If capital  is also mobile  and  skilled and
unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes in production, then trade and migration are complements
at both skill levels as long as the protected industry is more capital- and skill-intensive than the
non-protected industry.
In countries where emigration is an important phenomenon,  a more liberal trade regime
with internationally immobile capital will result in a labor force with a more favorable skill mix.
This finding is robust whether the comparison of trade regimes is made across countries or over
time.  In the case of internationally mobile capital, the effect of trade liberalization  lowers the
size of the labor force but has an ambiguous effect on the skill mix under plausible assumptions.
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